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AUSTIN OWEN LECTURE

DIFFICULTIES, DANGERS & CHALLENGES FACING THE
JUDICIARY TODAY
The Honorable Robert E. Payne*
Judge Payne presented this address at The Sixth Annual
Austin Owen Lecture on November 18, 1997.
The Honorable Austin E. Owen attended Richmond College
from 1946-47 and received his law degree from The T.C. Williams School of Law in 1950. During his distinguished career,
Judge Owen served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; a partner in Owen, Gray, Rhodes, Betz,
Smith and Dickerson; and was appointed Judge of the Second
Judicial Circuit of Virginia where he served until his retirement
in 1990. The Law School community grieved the loss of this
distinguished alumnus upon his death in March, 1995. In 1991,
Judge Owen's daughter, Dr. Judith 0. Hopkins, W'74, and sonin-law, Dr. Marbry B. Hopkins, R'74, established the Austin
Owen Lecture which is held each fall at the Law School.
I have had a highly rewarding experience in the practice of
law, and I envy those of you who are about to embark upon
that experience because, notwithstanding the critical remarks
often made about lawyers, the practice of law is a wonderful
career. It presents an opportunity to serve society. It provides
an opportunity to be challenged constantly. And, it is a vehicle
for the enjoyment of rewarding personal experiences while you
are being paid, not unhandsomely.

* United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia.
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I appreciate very much the invitation to be here to participate in this lecture series. It is indeed a privilege to be included among the list of notable people who have presented the
Austin Owen Lecture.
I asked for some information about the purpose for which the
Lecture was endowed, and I was told that Judge Owen's daughter had said this about it: "The presentation needs to be one
that teaches aspects of law that the students would not otherwise get during their regular curriculum." I have tried to follow
that instruction faithfully, although in today's complicated legal
world, I sometimes wonder whether there is any topic on which
you do not receive instruction.
I have, therefore, chosen to raise with you some of the rather
substantive difficulties confronting the federal judicial system
today. How we as judges, how we as the judicial system, and
how we as a society, address those troubles will in large measure determine how effective the federal judicial system continues to be in the 21st century. In many respects, these problems
are shared by the state and federal judicial systems, but I will
focus on the federal aspect of these problems.
First, there is an increasing tendency on our part as a society
to look to the federal judicial system to solve a great many of
society's problems. This is illustrated in the trend toward federalizing crime to secure more severe federal penalties and longer
prison terms.
For example, we now have a federal law that criminalizes the
failure to pay child support ordered by state courts.1 That, of
course, puts the federal courts into play in securing parental
support payments from dead-beat parents who will not pay
child support. We have statutes in the federal system directed
to the resolution of the question of domestic and other violence
against women.2 We have made a federal crime out of intrastate caijacking.' It recently has been proposed that we federalize a drunk driving standard.4 We are seeing an increase in
1. See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
2. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
3. See Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
4. See Eric Pianin, Senate Ties Crackdown on Drunk Drivers to State Highway
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the federal prosecution of gun related crimes that for years
have been considered state law enforcement matters.5
These are all serious issues in their own right. But, by resorting to the federal judicial system to solve these problems,
we create other problems, perhaps of even greater seriousness.
There is, of course, a threshold problem inherent in federalizing
what are at base local crimes because that intrudes on the
powers and duties of the states. Worse still, it allows the states
to escape their responsibilities, and it takes from them the important job of local law-enforcement in prosecuting local crimes.
I suppose that one could always create a scenario in which
federal interests are largely, significantly or importantly implicated in what one ordinarily would call local crimes. That
would, of course, eliminate the argument that such crimes are
essentially matters of local concern. But, it is, I think, important to maintain the balance between the federal and the state
criminal justice system which is reflected in the Constitution. It
is, therefore, important to resist the temptation to overlook the
local nature of problems to justify federalizing the solution.
Perhaps, the larger question is whether it is wise turn to the
federal law and the federal judicial system for the solution of
these problems? Without any question, avoidance of child and
spousal support in defiance of state law judgments creates economic impacts that are felt across the nation. But, is making
the enforcement of obligations of that sort a federal criminal
matter really necessary, and is it desirable? Violence against
women, domestic or otherwise, is a serious problem. So too is
intrastate car-jacking. So too is drunk driving. And, all of these
problems have impacts that often are not confined to one state.
But, what can federal law enforcement authorities who have
limited enforcement capacities really do about these problems?
Ask yourself, "Is there a federal police capacity large enough to
enforce these laws?" And, if not, ask yourself, "Do we want to
create a federal police capacity that is sufficient unto the task
of enforcing them?" Unless we increase our federal policing

Aid, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at A12; see also Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1997, S. 1173, 105th Cong.
5. See Jim Mason, Police Unit Scores Bull's-Eye in City Gun Seizures, RICH.
TIMs-DIsP., Feb. 5, 1998, at B1.
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capacity, we cannot enforce all Qf these laws. And, with that in
mind, think for a moment about what happens when government raises expectations that the legal and judicial systems can
address problems when, in fact, those systems cannot meaningfully address them.
In that context, consider also that there are approximately
1000 federal district and circuit judges (if you include the active
and senior status judges). It is, therefore, obvious that the federal judicial resource also is a limited one. What happens when
this limited resource is devoted to essentially local problems,
rather than to the federal issues, which the federal judiciary
was established to address? There is, I suggest, the risk of
unenforced law which means that societal expectations for the
federal judiciary cannot be realized. And, the ensuing consequence is the diminished effectiveness of, and respect for, the
federal judicial system as a whole.
The significance of that problem is even more serious when
one considers that each year Congress tends to establish new
species of federal civil claims about which the federal government and the federal courts, in reality, can do very little. Look,
for example, at Title IX of the Civil Rights Act,6 regulating all
sorts of activities within schools. I am not talking about the
part of Title IX which requires equal access in sports and to
sports funding.1 I am talking about regulations several inches
thick which tell schools what they have to do to address basic
problems associated with the operation of educational institutions, like the discipline of students and the prosecution of
students who commit crimes of a very serious nature, including
rape, on the campus.8 These are serious matters which are
worthy of attention. But, what can the federal judicial system
do about them? The federal courts are not equipped to deal
with problems of that sort. And what's going to happen, I fear,
is that the law simply will not be enforced. And, then those
people who were expecting the law to be enforced will be disappointed, and rightfully so.

6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)
7. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1997).
8. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 668.47 (1997) (discussing school crime and discipline
reporting procedures).
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Another place to look is in the employment law arena. Are
those claims important? You bet they are. Is it critical that
discrimination be rooted out of the work place? Yes. Is it wise
to make everything that happens in the employment setting a
matter which ought to be addressed in the federal courts? And,
while we are at it, is it wise to set up an administrative system
for handling employment discrimination claims that requires a
claimant to go through an agency that does not have the time
or the staff to consider the claims promptly-or perhaps not at
all?
Consider just one example. The other day the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") came into court and
represented that it did not have the resources to take on a
really significant issue.9 The issue was, "Should employers be
permitted in their employment contracts to establish an arbitration system for the resolution of employment related complaints?" I do not know of many topics in employment law that
are more important than that one. But, this agency actually
represented in court that it did not have the time or the resources to take on that issue.
If the EEOC does not have time or resources to address an
issue of this sort, and if, at the same time, Congress is making
new rights, new laws, and cutting budgets which further reduce
judicial resources, what is it that citizens can expect of the
federal judiciary in discharging its constitutional role in our
system of government?
Add to that set of circumstances, the requirement of the
Speedy Trial Act' that puts all criminal cases, no matter how
insignificant, in a priority position over civil cases. As you can
readily see, Congress has created a circumstance in which civil
dockets are backlogged, and judges have less time to devote to
civil matters. The consequence of that inevitably will be a decline in the quality of judicial decision making in the civil litigation arena.

9. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 3:97CV538 (E.D. Va. July 18,
1997).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (1994).
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We are fortunate that we do not have that problem in the
Eastern District of Virginia at this time. We still are able to
manage our civil dockets in an effective way, notwithstanding
the Speedy Trial Act. But, in many courts, the situation in the
civil area was perceived to be so bad that, not long ago, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act" to address this
widely occurring backlog in civil dockets.
Congress laid the blame for this problem on the judiciary.'
And, no doubt, many courts were to be faulted for being too
tolerant of lawyers and their seemingly insatiable quest for
delay. Some courts also may have deserved criticism for not
managing their dockets. Perhaps, there may even have been
courts which were to be faulted for slack work habits. But, the
real problem lies in the creation, by acts of Congress, of a vast
array of federalized crimes which are principally state and local
matters of concern and in the Congressional creation of an
increasing number of new federal civil claims.
Unless there is some measure of restraint by Congress, the
federal courts soon will have great difficulty in fulfilling their
principal role in the federal system of government. There are
other serious problems facing the judiciary today. I refer to the
increasing number of attacks upon the independence of the
judiciary. I digress for just a moment to remind you to take a
look at Evans v. Gore," where there is a thorough discussion
about the importance of an independent judiciary, and about
how critical the independence of the judiciary is to the proper
functioning of the balance of powers established by the Constitution and to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights.'4 And, I
ask you to keep that discussion in mind, when you read about
current developments which affe& the independence of the judiciary.

11. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992)). The Act requires judges to publish semiannually a list of all motions older than six months and all cases older than three
years.
12. In a recent Senate floor debate concerning making the publication requirement
permanent, Senator Biden commented that the requirement was needed because,
"'sunlight is the best disinfectant." 143 CONG. REC. S8528 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Biden) (quoting Justice Brandeis).
13. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
14. See id. at 249-53.
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Take, for example, the excoriation of the judge in New York
over a decision on a search and seizure issue.15 He became a
poster child in the campaign for the presidency. Republicans
clamored for his impeachment.' 6 And, even the President who
appointed him let it be known that he might ask for the judge's
resignation.' I ask you, "What does that say about judicial
independence?" I am not defending that ruling; indeed, I have
not read it. But, if the judge was wrong, there is a Second Circuit Court of Appeals which would have no difficulty in reversing an erroneous decision.
There is also the case of the judge who declared California's
Proposition 209 an affirmative action."B Just look at the fire
storm that was directed at him personally. 9 Personally, not
just at his opinion.
Closer to home, we have judges in our own circuit, in our
own district, who have been made campaign centerpieces themselves and have been castigated for being. so-called "liberal
judges,"2 o and "soft on crime."2 If you read the opinions
which led to those characterizations, I doubt that you could
really endorse that description of those judges. But, that is not
the point I seek to make.
Nor am I saying that judges should not be criticized for bad
decisions; to the contrary, they should be. What we do is open
to the public, and we ought to be openly criticized when we are
wrong. Moreover, it is fair to disagree with any judicial decision
(right or wrong) and to subject it to debate and analysis. But,
that criticism ought not to be personalized and it ought not be
designed to strike at the heart of the independence which is the
linch pin of the ability of the federal judiciary to fulfill its role
in our constitutional system. That is, however, where we may
15. See Washington Today: Concern over 'Political' Attacks on Federal Judges,
Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4850313.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Joan Beck, Prop 209 Ends Preferences, Not Opportunity, Hous. CHRON.,
Apr. 17, 1997, at 32, available in 1997 WL 6551619.
19. See, e.g., Discontinue Preferences, Deal with Racism Properly, ATLANTA J. &
ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 10, 1997, at A16, available in 1997 WL 3963778.
20. See Robert AL Kaufman, Politics Creating Havoc in the Federal Courts, CHL
TREB., Aug. 25, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 3581883.
21. See id.
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be heading. Look, for example, at the proposals on the floor of
the Congress to provide for impeachment of federal judges for
making specific decisions.' Think for a moment, if you will,
what that legislation, if it came to pass, would do to the independence of the judiciary.
There are, from the same sources and from conservative
media personalities, proposals to eliminate life tenure of federal
judges.' Life tenure is not the sine qua non of an independent
judiciary, but it certainly is an important concept in our federal
system. Indeed, it is a concept so basic, so important to the
founders of the Constitution, that there was almost no disagreement in the constitutional debates over the proposition that
judges in the federal system ought to be appointed for life and
ought to be free of reductions in compensation, so long as they
served upon good behavior.' That was, I submit to you, one of
the few things that the founders of the Constitution were able
readily to agree upon. And, we ought to be very reluctant to
make systemic changes that alter the central role which judicial
independence plays in our federal system of government.
State judges also are exposed to some of the same problems.
Not long ago, the term of a state judge was not renewed and
one of the reasons given was-there were several reasons given-but one reason given was that the judge had not granted a
continuance to a lawyer-legislator who wanted it.
There was another state judge last term whose term was not
renewed.' He was a perfectly good judge according to all the
records, but his commission was not renewed because he did
not give a gun permit to a prominent political figure.' Is that,
I ask you, a valid reason not to renew the commission of someone who has done a good job as a judge? And, there was no
question that he has done a good job serving the citizens of this

22. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
Timothy E. Flanigan), available in 1997 WL 11235718.
23. See Herman Schwartz, One Man's Activist: What Republicans Really Mean
When They Condemn JudicialActivism, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 1997, at 10.
24. United States ex- rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
25. See Allen Ditches Judge Who Yanked North's Weapon Permit, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
& LEDGER-STAR, May 8, 1997, at Bl.
26. See id.
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Commonwealth. What kind of message does that send to the
judges and to the populace at large? What effect do actions of
that ilk have upon the independence of the state judiciary?
Remember that the notion of an independent judiciary is but
a vehicle to assure fair and correct judicial decisions based on
the principled application of law, free of pressures that have no
proper role in the judicial decisional process. There is, inherent
in our system, the certainty that a particular judge will err
from time to time. However, the system provides redress for
that circumstance. An independent judiciary is essential to our
constitutional system. Any change in the system which diminishes that independence and which politicizes the application of
the law, in turn, weakens our constitutional rights. That threat
should not be ignored.
Now, there is no question that there is also a great danger to
the federal judiciary from within. Sometimes we can be our own
worst enemy. One of my colleagues says we must avoid at all
costs the "goofy decision" syndrome.' I am not going to use
the examples which he cited. But, federal judges have to be
careful because the power of federal judges is great. The exercise of that power has to be circumscribed by self-discipline,
and that means taking into account practicality and legality in
deciding cases. It always will be necessary for judges to decide
hard cases and sometimes in so doing to make cutting-edge
decisions. That, of course, cannot be done by yielding to public
opinion.
Nonetheless, the exercise of self-restraint in articulating the
basis of our decisions and in limiting their reach to that which
is essential to the issue presented for review makes it easier for
the public to accept those difficult decisions on the cutting edge.
Judges also have to remember that they can be wrong, even
when they think that they are right. As Learned Hand said
when he quoted Oliver Cromwell, "I besiege you in the bowels
of Christ think that we may be mistaken.' 2 "I should like to
have that written over the portals of every church," said Hand,
27. See The Fourteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 170 F.R.D. 534 (1996).
28. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIrT OF LMBERTY 229-30 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed.
1974) (1952).
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"every school and every courthouse, and may I say every legislative body in the United States, and I should like to have
every court begin every day with the intonation, I besiege you
in the bowels of Christ think that we may be mistaken.'
Too often it is easy for judges to forget that we may be mistaken. Of course, we should not be hesitant decision makers,
but, in making our decisions, we have to remember that we
may be mistaken, and that, in turn, ought to make us think
harder and make us be more circumspect about what we do
and more balanced in how we do it.
If we do that, I believe that we can avoid one of the biggest
problems that any judicial system can have, and that is the
ease with which judges can get out of touch with reality. It is
particularly easy for federal judges to succumb to that circumstance. We are appointed for life. And it is easy to become selfabsorbed, when everyone around you says, "Your Honor this,
and Your Honor that" and when not many people are willing to
take issue with you.
All judges, and particularly federal judges who have life tenure, have to guard against the risk of losing touch with those
whom we serve: litigants, lawyers, and society at large. It is
very, very important that we keep in mind who we are, what
we are, and why we are there.
Now, the next segment of my presentation is on the media
and the problems which it creates for the judiciary. And the
following section is on the effects of the changes in the practice
of law, and part of the first section is on cameras in the courtroom. And it's late. So I ought not give all of those remarks.
But, I do think that the judicial system as a whole must be
cognizant of the risks posed today by the media. Too often, the
media does its job without concern for accuracy. Too often the
test for publication is what can be said first and what can be
said sensationally, not whether what is said is right.
There is an increasing lack of appreciation on the part of the
media for the effect of what the media says in reporting on
events, particularly sensational ones. Pretrial statements in the

29. Id.
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media can adversely affect the right of the litigants to a fair
trial by an impartial jury and can make it very difficult to
select an impartial jury. Indeed, there seems to be little, or no,
concern by the media about the damage done to the judicial
system by erroneous reporting and by creating spectacles instead of just covering legal developments and trials accurately.
I do not know why that occurs; I just know that it does occur. I will not ascribe ill motives to people in the media. They
are trying to do a job. And, many of them do a wonderful job,
and not all of what I say applies to everybody in the media.
But, the media must exercise restraint to make certain that, in
fulfilling its role of informing the citizenry, it does not compromise the right of those accused of crimes and the right of society to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The abuses in sensational cases are chargeable against the
main stream, otherwise credible, media. The abuses occur in
both print and broadcast media. And, the abuses are committed
by media personalities and by media institutions. These abuses
often threaten the fairness of judicial proceedings and they
jeopardize the rights of the participants-the government and
the accused.
The Simpson criminal case is a notable example." But, I
put to you this observation: Many notorious cases have proceeded from investigation to trial without the same problems. Examples of that kind of case are the Oklahoma City cases, the
Unabomber case, and the World Trade Center cases.3 I suggest that the principal reason for that is the timely imposition
of orders by the courts curtailing lawyers' discussions with the
media.32 That was not done effectively in the Simpson criminal
trial.
Additionally, the media simply has lost self-control in sensational cases. The media, in that kind of case, most usually is in
a feeding frenzy, driven by money and ratings. The loser is our
judicial system.
30. See Catherine Cupp Thiesen, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of Shoes,
44 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 861 (1996).
31. See generally James E. Pfander, Allerton House '96: Measuring the Tension
Between Lawyers and the Press, 84 ILL. B.J. 576 (1996).
32. See id.
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A related problem is the incessant effort to bring cameras
into the courtroom. I tell you frankly that I am glad that, in
the federal courts, we do not allow it. Moreover, I hope that the
Simpson criminal case and the consequent loss of respect for
the judicial system sounded the death knell of cameras in the
federal courts for a long time-certainly, I hope, beyond my life
tenure.
Supporters of courtroom cameras respond that the judge let
the lawyers run the Simpson trial, and that, in turn, allowed
the press to turn the judicial mishap that was the Simpson
criminal case into a circus. That response, I think, simply ignores the underlying problem, and it levies blame on a personalized basis, and I do not think that is appropriate. The real
problem is that anytime you put people with egos the size of
good trial lawyers into a courtroom and turn the camera on
and give them a national publicity, they are going to perform
for the cameras. That puts the lawyers at the focal point of the
trial. And, that, in turn, takes the focus off of the evidence.
When that occurs, the parties are deprived of a fair trial on the
merits of the case.
Of course, there is another side of the camera issue. And,
there are, I am sure, some good things that can be said about
allowing cameras in the courtroom. But, I submit to you that
Oklahoma City case and the World Trade Center cases have
shown us how it is possible to run an efficient, fair trial without cameras and, at the same time, how media coverage-significant, informative, very valuable media coverage-can be integrated into a trial of that description. In so
doing, those cases have restored a good measure of the public
confidence that was lost as a result of what happened in the
Simpson criminal trial.
The biggest challenge to the judicial system, however, may be
in the changes in the practice of law which manifest themselves
even now. For example, there is an increasing and disturbing
lack of civility toward one's adversaries. And that is not
healthy. There must be an effort to restore civility to our system. The responsibility for doing that rests with lawyers and
judges.
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There is also an increasing tendency, I fear, to have lawyers'
own interests disproportionately affect the conduct of litigation
because the stakes have become so large. One third of a billion
dollars is a lot of money, but there are fees that large, and
larger, at stake in some current litigation. And, from time to
time, we see lawyers who overreach and overstate, and even
misrepresent the facts and the law in the quest for victory.
They are increasingly tempted in part to do that because the
stakes are so high. Somehow, we must find a way to provide
first quality legal service without making the interests of the
participating lawyers in the outcome of litigation so financially
large.
Today, I have but skimmed the surface of these problems
which are among those currently facing the federal judiciary. I
have raised them for your consideration without positing solutions. I have some ideas, but that, however, is the stuff of
which the future debate about these issues will be conducted.
And, the solutions are topics for other addresses. But, these
problems are real in the profession for which you are preparing
and into which you are about to enter. These problems, I do
not think, are addressed in your regular curriculum. So, even
though I have not postulated solutions, I hope that, by provoking you to think about these problems, I have fulfilled the principal purpose of the Austin Owen Lecture, and I hope that
these remarks have served the important purpose for which the
Lecture was chartered.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today. It's been
my pleasure.

